Campbell Corner Language Exchange
Panic in Proportion: The Case
for "Open Source" Science
by Shuba Gopal
>What do you think about the hubbub over public
info for the generation
>of epidemic causing viruses? Is this a real
issue, or some overblown
>reportage to sell newspapers?
I think it is a semi-real issue in that it is
a genuine concern that we may hand terrorists
some terrible weapon by not being aware of the
consequences of the research we do. On the other
hand, I think the newspapers, and our beloved
John Ashcroft, are far and away the bigger culprits
here.
First, let me try to put things in context. If
I remember correctly, this has to do with the
publication a few months ago of the results from
a genetic modification of the influenza virus
which created a
"super-virus" capable of somewhere in
the vicinity of 90-100% mortality rates in mice.
Essentially, the researchers identified a way
to switch off a key element in the immune response
to influenza,
and by extension, to many other viral infections.
After publication of the work, they were bombarded
with emails and government censure for having
published such "sensitive" work in a
public, peer-reviewed journal. As I recall, there
were harangues even within the scientific
community about how this information would now
be exploited by Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks
to effect horrifying death tolls on civilian targets.
All well and good. However, what I think many
people missed was the point of the paper, which
is that an immune response can be switched to
a highly effective clearance of virus by the ACTIVATION
of this protein. In other words, it was the absence
of the protein that caused the high mortality,
and turning it back on reduced mortality back
to expected levels of
somewhere around 10-20%. So now we have two pieces
of information - removing the protein creates
killer viruses, a tool that could become a terrifying
weapon. But we also know what is involved in resurrecting
the immune response. In subsequent papers this
summer, researchers have already shown preliminary
reductions in mortality rates by switching on
other immune system proteins that can counteract
the devastating effects of the loss of the original
protein. So science has already found ways to
counterbalance the potential threat.
I must digress at this point to comment that
the mind boggles at the average Al Qaeda terrorist
reading these highly technical scientific journals
in the first place. And then, hiding in a dusty
cave in some remote region of central Asia, one
wonders who would have access to a molecular biology
laboratory! This is not the sort of work you throw
together with a couple of sticks of dynamite or
some box cutters. It costs millions to set up
and operate a molecular biology laboratory of
the scale necessary to even begin modifying the
influenza virus. Sometimes we forget that the
NIH annual budget is well over $3 billion, and
that just because I can buy a PCR machine and
get some
influenza virus doesn't mean that I can then make
a killer virus before going home to supper with
the kids and goats in my friendly Afghan (or Iraqi,
North Korean, Russian, Chinese, etc) neighborhood.
So this is the sort of neurotic over-hyping that
degrades the American press and turns us all into
morbid curiosity mongers.
However, I think the larger question - how much
should we make public and how much should we keep
secret in these supposedly more dangerous times
- is a valid one. I would argue for as much public
knowledge as possible, and I would draw on two
examples from a different area of
technology, the computer industry.
About a decade ago, enthusiasts of encryption
algorithms fought a long and rather bitter battle
with the US government to allow public use of
encryption methods that had heretofore been the
exclusive province of secretive government agencies.
Many would argue that it was the
release of these algorithms into the general public
around 1994/1995 that fueled the boom of the internet,
which for all its inherent problems, has in some
small way contributed to an ongoing shift in the
way we interact with the world. During the long
court battle to release encryption algorithms
to the public, government officials argued that
the release of the encryption algorithms would
allow
terrorists and criminals to effectively bypass
any sort of monitoring and free them to act with
impunity. In the past eight years, I think there
have been fewer than a dozen cases of criminals
hiding data behind encryption, and of those, all
but one that I know of were caught, tried and
sentenced in spite of their efforts to conceal
their activities. So it turns out that we gave
the criminals a little bit too much credit in
this instance.
What releasing encryption to the public domain
did do, however, was suddenly expose a number
of serious security issues that the government
agencies were horrified to discover had existed
all along. Why was this? When you open an idea
or a technology to extensive scrutiny by a multitude
of people demanding a variety of tasks from a
piece of software, you immediately expose all
the problems with that piece of software. A collective
investigation and improvement effort has now yielded
security software that is considerably stronger
than it was when it was developed
in the shadowy cradle of government protection.
I would argue that "open source" as
such publicly edited software is known, yields
stronger, better programs in every instance. Another
case in point is the tremendous stability and
success of the Linux operating system when compared
to privately developed, protected operating systems
such as Windows. Linux is rapidly taking over
in areas where stability, security and reliability
are critical. For instance, a recent survey found
that upwards of 60% of all the world's internet
servers are running Linux or a related operating
system. The stability and security features of
Linux are a consequence of its open source development.
Individuals from across the planet contribute
to
its development and often anticipate problems
prior to their appearance. This has led to a truly
powerful, incredibly efficient operating system.
It has the added benefit that, since it was developed
by everyone, few feel disenfranchised by the system.
Linux has only one known virus and the security
hole it exploited has long since disappeared.
How many other operating systems currently on
the market can claim that?
I believe that, just as the computer industry
thrives in the open source environment, so does
science. One cannot do good science, or even any
science, in isolation. It is in the discourse
and
communication between many individuals, through
dialogue which under the best circumstances at
least parallels Socratic dialogue, that science
progresses. One mind, no matter how great, cannot
conceive of an entire system on its own. Even
Einstein needed help - he needed Planck's observations
to solve the photoelectric effect and he needed
others, who came afterwards, to provide experimental
proof of some of his predictions. Scientists are
fond of the cliche "standing on the shoulders
of giants" when they describe their work;
we cannot stand on nonexistent shoulders and we
cannot climb past those shoulders if we don't
know where to go next.
If anything, I would argue that the recent papers
on modifications to viruses are critical if we
are to prepare for a bioterrorist attack. They
are even more critical if we are to find a way
to assuage the
terrors of the world as they exist today - a world
in which millions die from disease, famine and
state-sponsored terror every day. Let us not lose
sight of the real problems here in a temporary
hysteria over a world that is as fraught with
terror, misery and inequality today as it was
just a little over a year ago.
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