Campbell Corner Language Exchange
Tragedy in the Philosophical
Age of the Greeks: Aristotle's Reply to Nietzsche
[1]
Michael Davis
Of Aristotle's writings none has had more staying
power than the Poetics. It has been
commented on by scholars too numerous to name
and even more impressively by the likes of Averrroes
and Avicenna (even though they seem to have had
at best a very unclear idea of what a tragedy
was[2]), Racine and Corneille,
Lessing and Goethe, Milton and Samuel Johnson.[3]
All this interest is rather queer given the subject
matter of the book. The Poetics is about
tragedy.[4] But Greek tragedy
is very unlike our drama. To mention only a few
of its exotic characteristics, it is performed
by at most three actors playing multiple roles,
wearing masks, accompanied by a chorus that is
both a character in the play and a spectator of
it, alternating between song and dialogue, before
audiences of up to 30,000 people. The chorus sings
using one dialect and speaks in another. The very
complicated poetic meter is based not on stress
but on the length of syllables. Since Greek language
was accented tonally, choral odes when sung must
have been particularly difficult to understand.
How were the tones of the individual words combined
with the tones of the tunes? So by our standards
it was strange. But did it not endure for a long
time? Not really--the great age of Greek tragedy
lasts for less than one hundred years. In this
it seems much less impressive than the novel.
Greek tragedy pretty much spans the life of one
man--Sophocles (and also, by the way, the life
of Athenian democracy). But was it not at least
very widespread? Again, not really. It was imitated
of course, but tragedy is predominantly an Athenian
phenomenon, restricted in large measure to the
area of Greece called Attica--hence Attic tragedy.
All of the Greek plays we now possess were originally
performed in one theater--the theater of Dionysus
on the slope of the Acropolis. Why then should
we be concerned with a book written 2400 years
ago about a literary form practiced for only a
hundred years in a single theater in a city more
or less the size of Peoria?
Friedrich Nietzsche. He is,
of course, not the only modern thinker to have
paid special attention to tragedy--one need only
think of his immediate predecessors, of Hegel
and Schopenhauer. Still, Nietzsche devoted a whole
book to tragedy and obviously thought it terribly
important. And ever since it was first published
in 1872, The Birth of Tragedy out of
the Spirit of Music has had an enduring effect
on how we understand not only tragedy as a literary
genre but how we understand culture and our own
condition. It is, for example, not at all surprising
that its key terms, the Apollinian and the Dionysian,
should have been appropriated by a recent ethnography
on Samoan culture. [5] For Nietzsche,
the Apollinian and Dionysian are present not only
in all art but virtually constitute human nature--one
pointing to our striving to individuate ourselves,
the other to our will to self-annihilation. We
long at once to establish our apartness from the
whole and to close the gap between ourselves and
the whole. These two drives look to be altogether
at odds, yet the fully human life requires their
simultaneous satisfaction. Nietzsche's formula
for tragedy--Apollinian form, Dionysian content--fulfills
this demand; in tragedy, we affirm ourselves in
our symbolic negation of ourselves. In the first
edition of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche
calls the satisfaction we derive from tragedy
"metaphysical solace." By 1886 he no longer likes
the term and speaks instead of a "pessimism of
strength." But regardless of its issue, the tragic
clearly cannot be understood as a solely theatrical
phenomenon, for Nietzsche surely does not mean
that when our Apollinian and Dionysian drives
are out of balance, we should attend a play--a
dose of tragedy as a sort of miracle drug for
our Ur-ailment. Tragedy applies finally not to
the stage but to a whole culture; accordingly,
Nietzsche once characterized the period of pre-Socratic
philosophy as "the tragic age of the Greeks."
Tragedy thus characterizes a
golden age from which we in the West have declined.
The cause of this decline--Nietzsche first places
the blame on Euripides and then on Socrates--is
the optimism characteristic of rational questioning.
For Nietzsche, Socrates' identification of virtue
with knowledge points to a deep error; the view
that for every question there must be an answer
leaves unquestioned the intelligibility of the
whole. With the failure to raise this question,
human beings fail to confront the truth of their
situation in the world. Nietzsche's Socrates might
be said to pave the way for the view that Oedipus
should have sought counseling and that, with the
proper legal help, Clytaemnestra and Agamemnon
might have arranged an amicable separation. On
the surface, at least, Nietzsche's great praise
of tragedy is therefore inseparable from an attack
on rationality. In making tragedy the alternative
to philosophy Nietzsche seems to agree with Plato
about the existence of an "ancient quarrel between
philosophy and poetry" (Republic 607b-c)
while disagreeing about which side one ought to
take. With Aristotle, on the other hand, the disagreement
seems complete, for in telling us that "poetry
is more philosophic and more serious than history"
(Poetics 1451b5-6) and in giving tragedy
the salutary moral function of the katharsis
of pity and fear in its audience, Aristotle appears
to call into question the "ancient quarrel" itself.
For Nietzsche, this is simply a decadent optimism,
no longer even aware that there is an alternative;
thus tamed, tragedy ceases to be terrible, which
is to say that it ceases to be tragedy. Nietzsche's
charge, then, seems to be that in misunderstanding
the relation between tragedy and reason, Aristotle
deeply misunderstands the very structure of human
life.[6] We shall see.
The first words, and traditional
title, of the Poetics are peri poiętikęs--concerning
the art of whatever it is that the verb poiein
means. Ordinarily poiein would mean "to
do," especially in the sense of "to make." It
is faire or machen. Then it gets
a narrower meaning as well--to make poetry. So
peri poiętikęs means "concerning
the art of poetry." Aristotle will argue that
tragedy is paradigmatic for poetry, and so the
book about poetry can be primarily about its most
perfect manifestation. Yet there is considerably
more at stake. At the very end of chapter three,
in his discussion of the history of comedy and
tragedy, Aristotle remarks that the Dorians lay
claim to having originated both, citing their
names as signs.
And they [claim to call] poiein by
the name dran, but they claim the Athenians
call it by the name prattein. (1448b1-2)
[7]
From dran, to do, comes drama,
meaning first something done and then our drama.
Now, while this seems scarcely more than a footnote,
by using poiein as the middle term to connect
the other two, in the context of the Poetics
Aristotle invites us to consider poiein
and prattein as synonyms. Should we accept
his invitation we would have to retranslate the
title of Aristotle's most frequently read little
book. Peri poiętikęs would mean
Concerning the Art of Action. The sort
of acting actors do would share something fundamental
with all action; poetry would somehow be at the
center of human life.
There is circumstantial evidence to support such
a view of the Poetics. If all human action
seems to aim at some good, and if the existence
of instrumental goods points toward a good for
the sake of which we choose all the others, and
if there is a science of this highest good, and
if as Aristotle says this is political science
(I've simply summarized the first paragraph of
the Nicomachean Ethics), then one
would expect poetry and politics to be very closely
linked. They are. Aristotle's Politics
ends with an account of music, and especially
poetry, as both the means for educating human
beings to be good citizens and the goal for which
they are educated.
There is also more elaborate evidence. In Book
III of the Nicomachean Ethics, courage
or manliness (andreia) is said to be the
proper mean with regard to the passions fear and
confidence. However since fear can be understood
as an anticipation of bad things generally, lest
courage be thought somehow equivalent to all of
virtue, the particular fear with which it deals
must be specified. As the most terrible fear is
of death, this must be what concerns courage--but
not all death. Courage comes into play where it
is possible for us to exercise choice. It is therefore
most of all concerned with facing death in war.
To make this point Aristotle compares drowning
at sea with fighting a battle. The comparison
recalls Iliad XXI where Achilles fights
with a river--called Xanthus by the gods and by
us, and Scamander by Achilles and the Trojans.
Achilles laments the possibility that he might
die in this ignominious way (toughing it out with
a river). To us who are aware that he is fighting
with a god, his fate does not look so disgraceful.
Aristotle knows, of course, that it is
possible to be courageous in a hurricane, but
thinks such courage is understood metaphorically.
The paradigm is always fighting in battle. The
account of the specific moral virtues, therefore,
begins with courage because courage is a model
for how to deal with all fear understood as anticipation
of the bad, and so for how to deal with the bad
generally. Aristotle focuses on a situation in
which we have a choice so as to provide a model
for behaving as though we always had a
choice. Accordingly, Achilles is not simply the
most courageous but the model for virtue altogether.
The hardest problem for Aristotle's
account of courage is that, while the moral virtues
are supposed to make us happy, courage is frequently
rather unpleasant and can easily make us dead.
Why, then, do the brave risk their lives? Aristotle
says it is for the sake of the kalon--the
noble or beautiful. But this kalon end
is clearly not present in the activity itself.
Neither killing nor being killed is by itself
beautiful. We must look elsewhere than the dead
bodies fouling the Scamander to see Achilles'
devotion to the kalon. The brave, presenting
an image to themselves of their actions as completed,
look at their deeds as others will look at them,
and so reap the benefits of honor even before
honor has been granted. The present action becomes
kalon insofar as it is made complete through
reflection or imagination. The brave, therefore,
do what they do, not because it is good, but because
they can say "it is good." This is what the kalon
means.[8]
Atypically, Aristotle goes out of his way in
the Ethics to discuss the spurious forms
of courage as well as the genuine. The highest
of these is political courage; its goal is honor.
For examples Aristotle quotes Hektor and Diomedes
worrying about what will be said of them if they
do not fight. But just what is it which differentiates
this from acting "for the sake of the kalon?"
If courage always means courage in war, then it
will always manifest itself in a political context.
Cities make war; individuals do not. But if courage
is a virtue, it ought to be something which transcends
any particular polis. This is just the
problem of Achilles. Apart from the polis
he cannot show his virtue, but once he returns
to the fighting, his motives are necessarily obscure.
Does he do it for Patroklos, for the Greeks, for
honor, for immortality? Courage is in principle
invisible, for one cannot see it apart from a
political context, which is to say apart from
the ulterior motives for action attributed to
the political man.
The most startling thing about
the account of courage in the Nicomachean Ethics
is that Aristotle uses almost exclusively fictional
examples--Achilles, Hektor, Diomedes, etc. Without
poetry there is virtually no possibility of seeing
that element that makes courage what it is. The
brave do not risk their lives out of a greater
fear, or shame, or confidence owing to superior
experience. And yet from the act itself it is
impossible to tell the difference between these
spurious forms of courage and the real thing.
We need the whole story, and only poetry gives
it to us. Poetry lets us see inside human beings
so that we can celebrate their devotion to the
kalon. This points us back to the earlier
account of the metaphorical character of courage
in a storm at sea. In a way, all courage
is metaphorical. Even Achilles is playing a rôle;
he knows his fate, and is therefore the paradigm
of the courageous man. Like all brave men, he
wants "to die like Achilles." Poetry makes it
possible to experience our action as whole before
it is whole. This wholeness then becomes a part
of the experience itself. Or rather, since the
conjunction does not really occur temporally,
poetry constitutes the experience. In the case
of courage what would be essentially painful is
transformed into something "pleasant."[9]
And insofar as courage represents all moral virtue
here, poetry would be the necessary condition
for moral virtue generally.
One can go one step further. Aristotle begins
the Poetics by addressing two apparently
different issues--the eidę or species of
the art of poetry and their powers and how to
put a poem together out of its parts.
Concerning both poiętikę [the art
of poetry, making, doing] itself and the forms
[eidę] of it, what power each has,
and how one should put plots together if the
poięsis [poem, thing made, thing done]
is to hold beautifully, and further from how
many and from what sort of parts it is, and
similarly also concerning everything else
belonging to the same inquiry, let us speak,
beginning according to nature first from the
first things. Now epic poetry [epopoiia]
and the making [poięsis] of tragedy,
and further comedy and the art of making dithyrambs
[dithurambopoiętikę], and most of the
art of the flute and of the kithara all happen
to be in general [to sunolon] imitations.
Aristotle is conducting a class
at once in fiction writing and in literary criticism.
An account of the art of making involves an analysis--a
taking apart--of the ways things are put together
(of course the pieces out of which something is
put together are not necessarily the same as the
pieces of our understanding of how it is put together).
Directly after the methodological remark in which
he announces his intention to begin from the first
things, Aristotle lists various forms of imitation.
Presumably imitations are the first things from
which Aristotle will make his beginning. But as
always derivative from what they imitate, they
are queer beginning points. For poetry the first
things apparently are second things; the evidence
is the immediate sequel.
But they differ from one another in three
ways--either by imitating in different things,
different things, or differently and not the
same way.
There is an ambiguity in the
Greek. To mimeisthai hetera
certainly means to imitate different things and
to mimeisthai heterôs to
imitate differently, but the accusative neuter
plural of an adjective can also be adverbial.[10]
If we were to take hetera here as the equivalent
of heterôs, beneath the admittedly more
obvious, conventional, and sensible reading, Aristotle
would be suggesting that what is imitated
is somehow the same as how it is imitated.
That how something is imitated is always the real
object of imitation seems crazy until one recognizes
that imitating the act of imitation itself would
mean depicting the peculiarly human element of
action.
Insofar as all human action
is always already an imitation of action, it is
in its very nature poetic. This places the beginning
of Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy--that
tragedy is an imitation of action--in a new light.[11]
The Poetics is about two things: poięsis
understood as poetry, or imitation of action,
and poięsis understood as action, which
is also imitation of action. It is the distinctive
feature of human action, that whenever we choose
what to do, we imagine an action for ourselves
as though we were inspecting it from the outside.[12]
Intentions are nothing more than imagined actions,
internalizings of the external. All action, as
poetic, is therefore imitation of action.
But what does this perplexing formulation mean?
The issue is really the same as arises, say, for
Freudian psychology. Why are we inclined to try
to understand ourselves in terms of what happened
to us when we were very young? The events of our
youth seem to be formative because they have a
sort of purity--they are so remote and
even get thought of sometimes as prenatal. These
events are meant on the one hand to be experiences
and so real, but at the same time perfect types
or forms and so formative. The power of Freudian
psychology for us has to do with its attempt to
understand experience in terms of a more purified
experience--that is, with its attempt to understand
experience poetically. But, of course, if all
experience is of this kind, how could there ever
have been a primal experience? My current
behavior might be understood as Oedipal, but the
initial "Oedipal" reaction cannot be understood
as Oedipal. That is the reason why it is characterized
by way of a poetic reference--i.e. by reference
to the behavior of an adult. A grown man
is understood in terms of a primordial event experienced
as a child who is, in turn, only intelligible
in terms of a myth about a grown man. In what
sense, then, can we ever discuss first reactions?
On the one hand, we cannot understand our experience
by way of some primal experience because what
determines our experience cannot be one
of our experiences. On the other hand, we do not
seem to be able to understand our experience in
any other way.
However plausible this connection between poetry
and action, it does seem funny for tragedy to
serve as the model for all human action. Just
to state the obvious, all human action is not
sad. The full account of what we are to make of
the turn to tragedy would be an odyssey requiring
an interpretation of the whole of the Poetics.
Fortunately, however, there is a shortcut that
hints at what is at stake. The two meanings of
poięsis--doing and poetry--are related
much as talking and singing, walking and dancing,
acting and acting. Human doing is double--it has
a self-conscious part and an unself-conscious
part. We are rational animals. Poetry, connected
to the self-conscious character of action (it
is through imitation, Aristotle says, that we
say "this is that"), at the same time manifests
the doubleness of human action within itself.
Aristotle turns to drama because, more than narrative
poetry, it reflects the distinction between doing
and looking at doing--between acting and reflecting.
On the one hand drama must attempt to convince
its audience of the reality of its action; on
the other hand it must always remain acting--actors
always imply spectators. Or, as George Burns once
said, "The most important thing about acting is
honesty; if you can fake that you've got it made."
Tragedy is the highest form of poetry because
it most embodies this doubleness. Now "plot is
the first principle and like the soul of tragedy"
(1450a38-39); the two principles governing plot--the
likely and the necessary--point back to the distinction
between the perspective of the actor and that
of the spectator. A character makes choices in
order to make certain consequences likely; he
assumes his freedom. What actually happens in
the play seems so perfectly intelligible to the
spectator as to seem to have been necessary. By
virtue of its structure, tragic plot accentuates
the tension between spectator and actor. The best
tragedies involve what Aristotle calls reversal
(peripateia) and recognition (anagnôrisis).
They are so to speak the soul of plot. Now, if
poetry is paradigmatic for action, and drama for
poetry--and if tragedy is the most complete form
of drama, plot the soul of tragedy, and reversal
and recognition the core of plot--then by looking
at Aristotle's treatment of recognition and reversal,
we ought to be able to learn something about why
tragedy is singled out as the model for human
action and thought.
Reversal is defined in Chapter 11 of the Poetics.
And reversal is the change of the things
acted/done to the opposite, as was said, and
this, just as we say, according to the likely
or necessary. (1452a22-24)
Aristotle's example is from Oedipus Tyrannus.
A messenger has just come from Corinth with the
"good news" that the king, Polybus, whom Oedipus
believes to be his father, has died. Oedipus expresses
some doubts about returning since he had originally
fled Corinth because of an oracle that had also
concerned his future intercourse with his mother,
and Merope, Polybus' wife, is still alive. This
messenger, never given a name or even a pronoun
by Aristotle,
coming so as to cheer Oedipus and to release
him from his fear regarding his mother, making
clear who he was, he did [epoięsen]
the opposite. (1452a25-26)
The "he" is ambiguous here. Does it refer to
Oedipus or to the messenger? Still, as disclosing
Oedipus' identity proves to require disclosing
the messenger's identity, the ambiguity seems
to make no difference. In either case the good
news proves bad. Intending to free Oedipus from
the fear of parricide and incest, the messenger
reveals that it was he who had originally brought
the baby Oedipus to Polybus and Merope. The result
is "a change to the opposite."
Now, it is clear that reversal involves some
violation of expectation. But whose? Since, as
Aristotle indicates, the reversal need not coincide
with any recognition within the play, the expectations
cannot be those of characters in the play. The
Oedipus would not be affected dramatically
were the messenger to leave before he discovered
that his good news backfired. At the same time,
since the turn of events involves not so much
a change as a reinterpretation of what has already
occurred, some recognition seems necessary.
Reversal must, therefore, be our recognition
as an audience that what we thought to be is not
what we thought it to be.
The account of recognition
begins with a reference to its etymology:
And recognition (anagnôrisis), just
as the name signifies, is a change from ignorance
(agnoia) to knowledge (gnôsis),
either to friendship or to enmity of those
being defined with regard to good fortune
or ill fortune. (1152a29-32)
Recognition is an-agnorisis,
a privation of ignorance. But we might also understand
its etymology as ana-gnorisis--knowing back or
re-cognizing. Since the very same syllables give
us two quite different etymologies, it is not
so obvious what "the name signifies." Now, when
the sort of ambiguity exemplified in Aristotle's
language here arises within a play, the conditions
are present for recognition.[13]
A prior confusion is discovered in a way that
alters the action of the play. Recognition is
thus the awareness within the play, i.e., a character's
awareness, that parallels the audience's awareness
of a reversal.
Aristotle says that recognition is most beautiful
when it coincides with reversal--when the discovery
within the play comes to be at the same time as
the discovery outside the play, or when the act
of understanding and the action itself are somehow
one.[14] He describes the recognition
which "especially belongs to plot and especially
to action" as the "one having been said" (1452a36-38).
Now, presumably this means the most beautiful
kind, i.e. where recognition and reversal coincide.
At the same time, certain recognitions occur when
a character comes to understand the significance
of things that he has previously said.
Oedipus does this sort of thing all the time.
He promises to pursue the murderer of Laius as
though Laius were his father (264-266). And he
begins Oedipus Tyrannus by addressing those
assembled around him as tekna Kadmou--children
of Kadmus. Oedipus treats them as though they
were his children; because he does not
know that he is by birth a Theban, he does not
realize that he too is a child of Kadmus, the
legendary founder of Thebes, that those under
his care as king may be like children, but they
are also his brothers and sisters, his fellow
citizens. For Oedipus, really recognizing who
he is would involve discovering the significance
of "what has been said." The beauty of Aristotle's
claim that the best recognition is "the aforesaid"
or, more literally, "the one having been said"
is that it is an example of itself.
A plot in which events simply followed one another
predictably, i.e. in which the likely turned out
to be the necessary, in which, for example, an
army of superior strength attacked an enemy and
won, would contain pathos but not reversal
or recognition. Reversal makes an audience reflect
on the necessity of action that at first seems
unlikely, for example, that in Sophocles' Trachiniae
Deianira's attempt to make Herakles love her should
end by killing him. Recognition introduces inference
into the play so that reflection on the likelihood
and necessity of the action becomes a part of
the action and so has further consequences within
the play itself. The turning point in Oedipus
Tyrannus is Oedipus' discovery of who he is.[15]
This sort of action--in which coming to knowledge
is decisive--is, not surprisingly, especially
revealing of human beings, the rational animals.
If plot means a change of fortune,
and the best change involves the coincidence of
reversal and recognition, in which direction ought
the change to occur? It would be, says Aristotle,
miaron--polluted or disgusting--were a
man who is epieikęs (decent, meet, equitable)
to move from good to bad fortune. Now, in Nicomachean
Ethics V Aristotle gives an account
of epieikeia as a virtue more just than
justice itself because it corrects the necessary
imprecision of law as general. Justice involves
general rules and so inevitably makes errors (hamartęmata)
because it never perfectly fits particular circumstances.
Equity always shows up as the correction of the
sort of error rooted not in obvious weakness or
vice but in pursuing goodness too rigidly. Epieikeia
is therefore morality which is at the same time
critical of moral idealism.[16]
To show someone with such moderate expectations
moving from good to ill fortune would, according
to Aristotle, be shocking. On the other hand,
to show the wicked moving from bad to good fortune
would arouse neither pity nor fear but righteous
indignation. Tragedy is apparently not meant to
cause utter despair of goodness in the world.
It is also not especially tragic to show the fortunes
of the villainous change from good to bad. Such
a plot might encourage philanthropeia--a
sense of solidarity with humanity (insofar as
justice prevails), but it would result neither
in pity (the villain gets what he deserves) nor
in fear (the one who suffers is not like us).
Tragedy, then, does not simply support morality
and subverts moral naivete.[17]
That tragedy is no simple morality play is signaled
by the change in Aristotle's language. The "good"
man--previously spoudaios or earnest (1448a2)--now
becomes the epieikęs--the man aware of
the impossibility of perfect justice.
What remains then is what lies
in between the epieikęs and the bad man.
Such a one is he distinguished neither in
virtue and justice nor changing to ill fortune
on account of badness and wickedness, but
because of some error of one of those being
in great repute [with a great opinion] and
good fortune such as Oedipus, Thyestes, and
renowned men of such families. (1453a7-12)
The subjects of tragedy are those who are thought
to be great. Are they also those who have great
opinions? Their error (hamartia) seems
to have to do with being too little aware of the
fuzziness of moral principles--too little epieikęs.
In one way such men are not virtuous; in another
they are too virtuous.[18]
According to Chapter 13 the change in plot must
move from good to ill fortune. Curiously Aristotle
seems to reverse himself in the followi ng chapter.
As actions may be done with or without knowledge,
there are four possibilities for the action in
tragedy. A character may intend to do something
knowing what he is doing, but because of some
accident not do it--this is not really drama.
A character may intend to do something knowing
what he is doing and do it--this is the case of
Medea. A character may do something without intending
to have done it and then discover what he has
done--this is the case of Oedipus. Finally, a
character may intend to do something, discover
that he did not really know what he was doing
and not do it--this is the case of Iphigeneia.
Aristotle calls the last the best (1454a4). But
how can it be best for Iphigeneia not to kill
her brother, that is, for the play to have a happy
ending, when tragedy requires a change from good
to ill fortune?
Aristotle's language here is revealing. What
the ancients did (poiein) as well as what
Euripides did (poiein) in the Medea
was to make the doing (prattein) come to
be with knowledge. Sophocles makes Oedipus do
(prattein) terrible things in ignorance
and then discover it. The "best" form is characterized
as intending to do (poiein) and then, discovering,
not to do (poiein) it. Now, up to this
point Aristotle had been using poiein to
refer to the activity of the poet and prattein
to apply to the activity of the character. Leaving
this distinction in tact, what he calls best here
would not be an action within the play, but rather
the action of the poet.
Let us see if we can put some of these issues
together. Reversal is an event in a play that
leads the spectator to reflect on the events of
the play. Recognition introduces this sort of
reflection into the play as a piece of the action.
By introducing the epieikęs Aristotle pointed
to a kind of virtue, the highest kind, which is
only possible as a reflection on the imperfection
of virtue. But why is this highest man not the
subject of the highest form of poetic imitation?
Poetry could never present the highest virtue
if the highest, like epieikeia, necessarily
takes the form of a reflection on the imperfection
of the "best." No action could ever reveal the
virtue which always takes the form of a reflection
on action. Insofar as a poet wished to "present"
the best he would have to present an action that
causes reflection (i.e. reversal) rather than
presenting the reflection itself (recognition).
And insofar as human action approaches its best,
the actor would have to present to himself an
action that causes reflection. The activity of
the epieikęs is something like literary
criticism; it consists in seeing where others
have gone wrong.
Still, Aristotle certainly says that the best
plot, and so the best tragedy, combines reversal
and recognition--it makes reflection an action.
Tragedy thus distinguishes itself from other forms
of poetry by making the poetic character of human
action thematic. However, to present in action
a successful reflection on action (epieikeia)
would not arouse wonder and so not lead to
reflection; it would be too pat, and so essentially
invisible. The goal of tragedy is the stimulation
of pity and fear because reflection is stimulated
only by failure--"All happy families are alike;
each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."
There is no wonder without some appearance of
discrepancy. Therefore, the
options for combining reversal and recognition
seem to be these. The poet can either show the
failure of genuine epieikeia which does
not seem possible since epieikeia consists
in the ability to foresee the ways in which one
cannot expect virtue to be manifest in the world.
Or, he can show the failure of spurious reflection.
This is in fact what occurs when reversal becomes
recognition. Tragic recognition will always in
some sense be false recognition. It must be subject
to a higher order reversal in order to stimulate
wonder. Oedipus thinks that he knows who he is,
but when he takes the pin of Jocasta's brooch,
stabs himself in his eyesockets (arthra)
and orders himself set out on Mt. Kithairon, he
is simply reproducing what his father did to him
as a baby, pinning his joints (arthra)
and ordering that he be abandoned on Mt. Kithairon.[19]
If he really knew "who he was" Oedipus would not
once again be attempting to take his fate into
his own hands, to become his own father. Blinding
himself was not an altogether humble thing to
do. He still has not learned that he too is one
of the tekna of Kadmus. However, had he
learned who he was, we would have been
unable to learn who he was. Character, perhaps
the true object of imitation in tragedy, is invisible
except through plot.[20] For
this reason, in his ranking of the various forms
of recognition in Chapter 16, Aristotle finds
particular fault with that sort which is willed
by the poet. When a character simply reveals who
he is, the meaning of the recognition is altogether
hidden from view.[21] The epieikęs
can express his knowledge even to himself only
by articulating what would happen to him were
he not to know. Oedipus could only have expressed
wisdom by writing his own tragedy.
To be a rational animal does not mean what it
seems to mean. It does not mean that there is
a battle within us sometimes won by our good part
and sometimes won by our bad part. This would
make us monsters. The mixture within us is more
intimate. As the tragic formula indicates, we
learn through suffering or undergoing (pathei
mathos); there is something irrational about
our rationality. Accordingly, Aristotle's examples
of the best forms of recognition all involve inferences
(sullogismoi) that turn out to be paralogisms.
Tragedy has as its goal making visible the most
important thing about human beings, which as essentially
invisible, cannot be shown as it really is. The
action that poetizes the world cannot be shown
in poetry. Imitation can only be imitated by showing
what it is an imitation of; it must always hide
behind its object. It is indeed the first thing,
but it must always appear as a second thing.
It is the plot alone which differentiates one
tragedy from another, and what constitutes plot
is desis (complication, involvement, binding,
raveling) and lusis (denouement, resolution,
loosening, unraveling). Desis includes
the action from the beginning or archę (which
frequently includes events prior to the beginning
of the play) up to the extreme point (eschaton)
where the weaving together of the events of the
plot stops and things begin to unravel. The lusis
is all the rest from the archę of the change
until the end (telos) of the play. Now
there is no question that Aristotle means us first
to take this account linearly or temporally. There
is a part of any tragedy in which things are put
together and a part in which they are taken apart.
At the same time, the key terms of the account
all allow for another interpretation. Suppose
archę means not temporal beginning but
first principle, telos not temporal end
but purpose, eschaton not temporal or spatial
extreme but utmost, and, most important, lusis
not denouement but resolution understood as something
like ana-lysis. For this last there is evidence
internal to the Poetics where Aristotle
uses lusis to mean solution or resolution
(1460b6, 1461b24) and luein to mean to
solve or resolve (1460b22).[22]
Now, if lusis meant analysis or interpretation
here, Aristotle would be saying that tragedies
ought to supply there own analyses.
This would explain the emphasis in the sequel
on the fact that poets are often quite good at
desis (that's what it means to be a poet--to
make up stories or put together plots) but less
frequently good at lusis. This is Aristotle's
version of what Socrates says of the poets (Apology
22c)--that "they say many beautiful things but
know nothing of what they say." Poets, ordinarily
good at the part of poiętikę which involves
putting the parts of a poem together, are not
as a rule so good at the other part--analysis
of poems according to their eidę. Tragedy
is a crucial exception to this rule, for in tragedy
part of the plot is lusis, an analysis
of its action. Tragedy is distinct in being simultaneously
synthetic or genetic-- desis, and analytic
or eidetic--lusis. On one level, then,
the movement from desis to lusis
is simply linear--there is a point in the play
where things begin to unwind. On another level
desis and lusis are the same. Once
Oedipus utters his first words, O tekna kadmou,
the meaning of his incest has already been revealed;
he is the father who does not know himself to
be a brother. Tragedy is something like a metaphorical
analysis of metaphor in which events function
simultaneously as parts of a play and principles
of its analysis. Things which look at first accidental,
in retrospect become absolutely necessary. Lusis
in its deepest sense is not a part of the plot
but a second sailing--a rereading that makes visible
what was implicit from the outset but could never
have been seen without first having been missed.
Tragedy is especially revealing of human action
because it not only tells a story that is significant
or meaningful, but also makes the fact that the
story can be meaningful a part of the story it
tells. Pathei mathos, the lesson of tragedy,
is at the same time the structure both of human
action and of human thought. Human action
is imitation of action because thinking is always
rethinking. Aristotle can define human beings
as at once rational animals, political animals
and imitative animals because in the end the three
are the same. In human action as in tragedy everything
depends upon the intention of the actor. But that
intention cannot be shown directly--it has to
be revealed through action. When a poet tries
to introduce intention directly it looks arbitrary
and cannot be distinguished from chance. The true
deus ex machina, the god in the machine, is
therefore the human soul; it disappears as soon
as one makes it visible. Ironically, the significance
of our actions becomes visible only by reversing
what we thought their significance to be. But
that of course requires the initial assumption
that one can see significance without reversal.
You have to assume that you can see someone's
character in order to see his action. This is
what allows you to have your impression of the
action reversed as the tragic plot turns on itself
so that you can "see" the character in question.
We must assume Oedipus innocent in order to understand
his true guilt. Blundering would seem to be the
fundamental character of human action and thought.
If thought, and so human action,
is essentially poetic in its need to put in place
and time what cannot appear in place and time
does that mean it is essentially tragic? That
is, if the recognition of tragedy is always spurious
recognition, doesn't that mean we are essentially
incapable of getting hold of ourselves? It does
and it doesn't. Tragedy depicts tragic action,
but it is not itself tragic, for if we recognize
ourselves in the spurious character of Oedipus'
recognition we are not simply in the position
of Oedipus.
That Aristotle understands this to be true of
tragedy is clear from the great compliment he
pays it by imitating it. The Poetics is
a very playful book. In the middle of his discussion
of tragic error, Aristotle muses about whether
those who criticize Euripides "err" (1453a8-23).[23]
And in a remarkable tour de finesse digresses
abruptly in Chapter 12 to discuss the chorus;
the digression proves to be an example of how
the chorus works in tragedy. Having introduced
reversal and recognition, Aristotle moves without
explanation to a short chapter on the parts of
tragedy. So out of place does chapter 12 seem
that many editors have suggested moving it (beginning
with Heinsius in the 17th century), and many others
(e.g. Butcher and Else) do not accept it as genuine.
The chapter is certainly queer; at first glance,
its list of parts--prologue, episode, exode, parodos,
stasimon and commos--seems connected to nothing
else in the Poetics. Upon reflection, however,
one notices that each part is defined in terms
of its relation to the chorus. Now the chorus
has a funny function in tragedy. It is a character
insofar as what it says grows out of the plot--to
understand the famous chorus in Antigone
about man as the being most deinos of all
(simultaneously most canny and uncanny), one must
understand to what the chorus responds by making
this claim. At the same time the chorus reflects
and comments on the action of the plot,
and so talks directly to the audience. The role
of the chorus therefore allows it to participate
on the levels of both reversal and recognition.
The chorus is then in a way the defining feature
of tragedy--Nietzsche notwithstanding, the spectator
within the drama. It is especially meet that Aristotle
should discuss it in a "digression." Chapter 12
of the Poetics functions just like a stasimon;
because it seems only marginally connected to
what surrounds it, a choral ode looks like a reflection
on what comes before and after. It is both still
within the dramatic time of the play and at the
same time atemporal. This chorus has as its content
the centrality of the chorus for tragedy and so
sheds light on what is at stake in the discussion
of recognition and reversal which surrounds it.
In this and countless other
ways the Poetics is a clever imitation
of tragedy. Aristotle announced in his very first
sentence that poiętikę would involve putting
together synthetic and analytic accounts. It is
not surprising then that his book should admit
of being read on two levels. It is about tragedy,
but it is also about human action. The first is
its desis, the latter its lusis.
(One might be tempted to say the Poetics
is two books--a palimpsest, and Umberto Eco erred;
the famous "second book" of the Poetics
did not perish in a fire in an unknown abbey in
the fall of 1327.)
On the one hand, then, Nietzsche
did not err. For Aristotle, the "ancient difference
between philosophy and poetry" must finally give
way to a deeper kinship--"the lover of myth is
somehow also a philosopher."[24]
The animal by nature mimetic is the same as the
animal by nature rational.[25]
Yet Nietzsche does seem to have erred in underestimating
Aristotle's grasp of the intimacy of the relation
between the rational and the irrational, for Aristotle
did not so much rationalize poetry as see how
the poetic was a necessary moment of reason. Much
to our surprise, in this the sober Aristotle is
not so far from the somewhat less sober Nietzsche.
Despite its Dionysian content, The Birth of
Tragedy is a work of markedly Apollinian form.[26]
Nietzsche several times makes clear that the book
was intended not simply as a paean, whether to
music, poetry, or Richard Wagner, but rather as
itself a new kind of philosophy.
In this sense I have the right to understand
myself as the first tragic philosopher--that
means the most extreme opposite and antipode
of a pessimistic philosopher. Before me, this
transformation of the Dionysian into a philosophical
pathos did not exist: there was a lack
of tragic wisdom.[27]
What might the general character of this tragic
philosophy be? Sixteen years after its initial
publication, The Birth of Tragedy was republished
with a revised title--The Birth of Tragedy,
Or: Hellenism and Pessimism--and a new
introduction called "An Attempt at Self-Criticism"
(apparently Nietzsche was unsure of the success
of his criticism). Werner Dannhauser has pointed
out a curious feature of the new introduction.
Fewer than ten pages long, it nevertheless, contains
more than seventy question marks--thirty-one in
the first of its seven sections.[28]
This is not accidental; in the first sentence
Nietzsche calls The Birth of Tragedy a
fragwürdiges, or questionable, book that
deals with a question of the first rank. He goes
on to speak of questions and question marks at
least fourteen times--thrice in this first sentence
alone. Nietzsche, for whom inquiry, science, and
reason, seem such questionable enterprises thus
begins an inquiry into the meaning of his own
book.
Now, a question is a kind of longing--an expression
of a need. This is connected to the other strand
of the argument at the outset of the "Attempt
at Self-Criticism"--an account of the birth of
The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche tells us
that he started work on the book when he was a
medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War. At
the time of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, he
completed the final version "while at peace with
himself" but convalescing from a disease contracted
during the war. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche
calls attention to the disparity between the conditions
under which the book was begun, the battle of
Wörth, its subject matter, the Dionysian, and
the strange neutrality and detachment that makes
it seem so untimely.[29] Nietzsche
is in the middle of a war "troubled and yet untroubled."[30]
He is governed by necessity and yet reflective--but
not about his immediate situation. What is the
question that preoccupies this musing soldier?
If art always originates out of some need, and
if the Greeks were the healthy people,
why should they have had art at all? Moreover,
why that form of art, tragedy, that seems to concentrate
on the ugly? Nietzsche seems to have been able
to begin to answer this question because of the
ambiguity of his own situation. He is needy (he
is ill and at war) and yet not (he is curiously
detached). Now, this all has something to do with
that state of mind in which it is possible to
ask any question. To question is not simply to
respond mechanically to a perceived need, for
to ask for the answer to a puzzle that is not
of immediate concern requires a certain confidence
and overabundance. Could Nietzsche mean for the
act of questioning to serve as a model for what
he will call the "pessimism of strength" that
characterizes tragedy?
If art grows out of some need and is always meant
to combat some doubt about the value of life--a
pessimism, then mustn't the Greeks too have been
unhealthy? Nietzsche suggests an alternative.
Perhaps the suffering to which Greek art was a
response was one of overabundance. Such art would
not be a compensating optimism that projects a
better life but a celebration of suffering--ultimately
tragedy--as the condition of the deepest life.
But, if the model for tragedy is the question,
isn't the more obvious offshoot of questioning
the optimism that anticipates an answer? And isn't
this the science that undermines the very possibility
of tragedy--it tells us that the answer to the
problem of Oedipus is counseling? Such questioning
would be a flight from pessimism--its result,
that cheerfulness that is for Nietzsche a sign
of decay. It is striking that science should make
its first appearance in The Birth of Tragedy
as an obstacle to truth. One might say, then,
that the act of questioning involves a certain
pessimism, or neediness, as well as a certain
strength, for asking a question means acknowledging
that an answer is not immediately available. The
consequence is a longing to know that ironically,
or perhaps tragically, tempts us to replace uncertainty
of the question with the certitude of the answer.
This is the importance of the famous phrase in
which Nietzsche characterizes the goal of The
Birth of Tragedy: "to see science from the
point of view of the artist but art from the point
of view of life" (SC.2). While itself derivative
from the fundamental act of questioning, science
nevertheless no longer questions fundamentally,
for it takes the act of questioning itself for
granted. The problem is that a verb, wissen, gets
itself transformed into a noun, Wissenschaft.
When The Birth of Tragedy was first published,
it was controversial--certainly not Wissenschaft.
Nietzsche tells us that in the time between the
first edition and his self-criticism the book
became "proven" and "has satisfied (genuggetan
hat) 'the best men of the time'" (SC.2).
But in this it resembles "the Socratism of morality,
the dialectic, satisfaction (Genügsamkeit),
and cheerfulness of the theoretical man" that
killed tragedy (SC.1). Now, Nietzsche says,
he finds the book disagreeable--a set piece. Yet
in finding it disagreeable, he recognizes the
strangeness of the question it asked and in a
way renews this question. The goal of the book
is "to see science from the point of view of the
artist but art from the point of view of life."
Science cannot ground the question of science
because, as directed toward answers, it is not
sufficiently in awe of its own activity. The question
of science, then, according to Nietzsche, can
only be asked from the point of view of the Kunstler--the
artist or producer. To see what is involved in
the posing of a question, one must look at the
questioner, not the question; otherwise one will
not see the need out of which the question was
born. As an artifact--something made, even science
requires a motive. Seeing science in this way
will lead us to attempt to find a general answer
to the question of why it is that artists make
art. In so doing, we will attempt to understand
life as such. Nietzsche's question amounts to
asking what in general lies underneath our attempt
to get at the truth in general.
"To see science from the point of view of the
artist but art from the point of view of life"
is a project that suggests that art is what mediates
between living, on the one hand, and thinking,
on the other. Art involves making an alternative
world and so makes it possible to judge this world.
It thus makes science possible. But why this judging?
This question leads us to life. Art is the distinctive
feature of human life both in terms of doing and
in terms of thinking. The mimetic animal is the
rational animal.
Nietzsche's criticism of his own book at first
seems simple: "It should have sung this 'new soul'--and
not spoken" (SC.3). He should have spoken
as a poet or at least as a philologist. The problem
was that there was a problem. That is, The
Birth of Tragedy was born of need and not
abundance. Accordingly, it was not Greek; what
it said was at odds with how it said it. Yet,
that its form is thus at odds with its content
makes it look suspiciously like what it is describing--Greek
tragedy. It is an account of the tragic death
of tragedy--tragic because growing out of the
very nature of tragedy itself. Once accepted,
however, this tragedy ceases to be tragic. Accordingly,
Nietzsche criticizes The Birth of Tragedy
for being too rational, and so for being not rational
enough--lacking in "logical cleanness" (SC.3).
Just as science is too rational, hence too unquestioning,
hence too little rational, The Birth of Tragedy
was too rational, hence too complacent, hence
insufficiently rational. Nietzsche criticizes
himself for appearing to be a misologist; he ought
to have appeared to be a philologist--reveling
in what logos makes possible rather than
bewailing what it makes impossible.
The issue of the book is the Dionysian, but there
is something of the act of questioning
as opposed to its results that is connected to
the god, Dionysus. In asking "What is Dionysian?"
(SC.4), Nietzsche asked after the essence of the
chaotic; he turned a name, Dionysus, into a noun,
"the Dionysian." One "who knows" gave an answer
and therewith threatened to undermine what gives
rise to questions. What Nietzsche did thus threatens
to undermine what gave rise to questioning and
inspired speech; he ought instead to have given
an account of questioning that did not undermine
questioning. This was why he was preoccupied with
tragedy. Tragedy is a form of answer which as
pessimism preserves the question. Yet, that Nietzsche
acknowledges his failure shows how difficult this
task is.
Sixteen years after publishing The Birth
of Tragedy Nietzsche returns to his answer
and expresses dissatisfaction. By now undermining
the answer he once gave, he rejuvenates his original
question and therewith gives new life to his previous
answer. He thus attempts to restore to The
Birth of Tragedy its tragic status. His is
an attempt at self-criticism that he hopes
will fail insofar as it succeeds, for only by
keeping the question alive in the answer it generates
can the answer remain an answer. The Birth
of Tragedy both describes and itself exemplifies
a pessimism of strength that provides metaphysical
comfort in the face of the flux of being. This
is why we can only learn through suffering; pathei
mathos is for Nietzsche no less than for Aristotle
the formula for human thought. In apparently thinking
he had surpassed Aristotle, Nietzsche seems in
his idiosyncratic way rather to have reconstructed
from the decayed tradition of Platonic and Aristotelian
"rationalism" Aristotle's understanding of the
dependence of philosophy on poetry. Their serious
differences notwithstanding, for both Aristotle
and Nietzsche human reason is a funny thing, insofar
as its misuse seems to be the necessary condition
for its use. Acknowledging this oddity of human
nature may in one way or another be the mark of
every genuine philosopher.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1]. Of the following argument,
much of the part concerned with Aristotle appears
in my The Poetry of Philosophy: On Aristotle's
Poetics and has been reproduced here with
the permission of St. Augustine's Press. *
[2]. Although they do not seem
to have possessed any tragedies, their commentaries
are filled with interesting remarks. Still, Aristotle's
account alone was not enough for Avicenna to recognize
that tragedy was more than "the praise meant for
a living or dead person."*
[3] . See Averroes, Middle
Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, C. Butterworth,
trans. (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2000);
Dahiyat, I.M., Avicenna's Commentary on the
Poetics of Aristotle: A Critical Study with and
Annotated Translation, (Leyden: Brill, 1974);
Corneille, Pierre, "Discours de la Tragédie" in
Théatre complet, vol. 1, (Paris: Garnier,
1971) , 33-56; Racine, Jean, Preface to Phčdre,
(Paris: Larousse, 1965); Lessing, G.E., Hamburgische
Dramaturgie, Nrs. 73-83 in Werke, vols.
6-7, (Leipzig: Bibliographische Institut, 1911);
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Nachlese zu Aristotelische
Poetik in Goethe the Critic, introduction
and notes by G.F. Semnos, revised and completed
by C.V. Bock (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1960), 60-63; Milton, John, Preface
to Samson Agonistes in Poetical Works, (New
York: American News Company, no date); and Boswell,
James, Life of Samuel Johnson, LLD., (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1934)*
[4]. The general, but not universal,
view is that there were originally two books to
the Poetics, one on tragedy and a second
on comedy. In our text, recovered about 1500,
there is no account of comedy.*
[5] . See Shore, Bradd, Sala'Iliua:
A Samoan Mystery (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982).*
[6] . See Menscliches, Allzumenschliches,
section 212 where Nietzsche praised Plato for
having understood the unsettling character of
tragedy while criticizing Aristotle for having
thought it has a calming effect through a purgation
of pity and fear. In a later section (264) Nietzsche
criticizes Aristotle as ingenious and clever,
but unable to differentiate between cleverness
and boredom. For Nietzsche's criticism of Aristotle
on catharsis see Götzen-Dämmerung, "Was
Ich den Alten verdanke," section 5; the criticism
is quoted in the section on The Birth of Tragedy
in Ecce Homo.*
[7] . All translations of the
Poetics are my own and are of the Greek
text of D.W. Lucas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).*
[8]. Compare this to the first
book of the Politics where our natures
as political animals are traced to our natures
as the animals with logos--speech or reason.
We are not political simply because we seek good
things; we are political because we seek what
we understand to be good. This is the difference
between a polis and a beehive.*
[9]. This is not unlike what
occurs in tragedy. See Poetics 1448b10-20.*
[10]. Aristotle goes out of
his way to indicate the adverbial use of the accusative
in the last words of the sentence--kai me ton
auton tropon.*
[11]. See Poetics, Chapter
6.*
[12]. It therefore looks like
a product or something made--a poem. As Aristotle's
account of imitation in chapter 4 indicates, mimęsis
has a peculiar doubleness to it. It means both
the action of imitating--the mimicking we do from
childhood--and the product of imitating--the poem
or painting which results from representing.*
[13]. Consider Herakles' reinterpretation
of the meaning Zeus' promise that he would not
die at the hands of anything living (Trachiniae
1157-1178)--he first takes it to mean he will
not die, but later understands it to mean he will
be killed by the poison from the blood of the
dead centaur Nessus.*
[14]. It is worth noting that
Aristotle does not say that the discovery is the
same discovery.*
[15]. It is surely no accident
that the "moment" at which Oedipus learns "who
he is" should be so fuzzy. Directly after the
messenger tells him he is not the son of Polybus,
Oedipus seems as concerned that Jocasta will think
him ill born as he is that he is in fact the son
of Laius (1062-63).*
[16]. See Ronna Burger's "Ethical
Reflection and Righteous Indignation: Nemesis
in the Nicomachean Ethics" in Aristotle's
Ethics: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy
Vol. IV, John Anton and Antony Preus eds., (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1991) *
[17]. Accordingly, Aristotle
is silent about the plot in which the good man's
fortune alters from ill to good.*
[18]. This is born out by Aristotle's
examples--Alkmeon and Orestes killed their mothers,
but to avenge their fathers; Oedipus seeks to
become master of his own fate, but to avoid the
necessity to kill his father and marry his mother;
Meleager is killed by his mother after accidentally
killing his uncles; Thyestes, brother of Atreus,
seduced Atreus' wife, and, to punish him, Atreus
feeds him his children; Telephon is punished for
accidentally killing his uncles. These cases seem
to point to conflicting moral issues which do
not admit of straightforward solution.*
[19]. See Seth Benardete, Sophocles'
Oedipus Tyrannus, in Ancients and
Moderns, New York, 1964, pp. 1-15. *
[20]. Notice how the long awaited
discussion of character in Chapter 15 quickly
gets derailed and turns into a discussion of plot.
This movement perfectly mirrors the dependence
of character on plot, of the inside on the outside.*
[21]. On the importance of
seeing for tragedy see Chapter 17.*
[22]. lusis appears,
before having been defined, in Chapter 15 (1454a37)
where Aristotle indicates that it ought to come
out of the plot itself and not be generated "from
the machine."*
[23]. In fact these men who
err (hamartanousin) make the error that occurs
within tragedy. They demand that justice prevail
in the world. And if Euripides appears to be the
"most tragic" of the poets, perhaps it is because
he does what he ought to do even when the end
does not follow from his plot. That is, Euripides'
action in writing as he writes, his uniform adherence
to a rule, has the makings of tragedy.*
[24] . Metaphysics, 982b18-19*
[25] . See Poetics 1448b5-6,
Nicomachean Ethics 1098a, and Politics
1253a.*
[26] . See Werner Dannhauser,
Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1974), 49, 59-60.*
[27] . Ecce Homo, "Die
Geburt der Tragödie," section 3. All translations
of Nietzsche are my own and follow the German
text of Karl Schlecta, Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke
in Drei Bänden (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1966).*
[28] . Werner Dannhauser, Nietzsche's
View of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1974), 77.*
[29] . See Ecce Homo,
"Die Geburt der Tragödie," section 1.*
[30] . "Attempt at Self-Criticism,"
section 1--hereafter SC, with the section
number following.*
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